A jury convicted Hutchins of possessing items with intent to convey them for methamphetamine manufacture and permitting her child to be present where methamphetamine was being made. The Court of Appeals held the evidence insufficient on the first count because the State showed Hutchins’s awareness of and proximity to the items, but not sole possession or intent to convey them; it held the evidence sufficient on the child-presence count because jurors could infer that she knew her mother was manufacturing methamphetamine and knowingly allowed her three-year-old child to remain in the home. The court nevertheless reversed both convictions because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony and cross-examination portraying Hutchins as part of a prescription-drug “pill ring,” improper character evidence that likely affected the jury’s assessment of her knowledge and intent. The court also held that the willful-blindness instruction was erroneous because it could lead the jury to treat knowledge and intent as interchangeable, an issue addressed because it could recur at retrial. The judgments of conviction were reversed.