The Atlanta Gleaner.

Legal News

Edited By George Washington

(Testing in progress)

George Washington Statue at Federal Hall

Elonisv.United States

CourtSupreme Court of the United States
Docket No.13-983
DecidedJune 1, 2015
Reporter575 U.S. 723 (2015)
JudgesChief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Samuel A. Alito Jr., and Clarence Thomas; Roberts authored the Court’s opinion, Alito concurred in part and dissented in part, and Thomas dissented
Tags
CriminalCriminal LawFirst AmendmentFree SpeechStatutory InterpretationJury InstructionsReversalDissent
Case Summary

Anthony Douglas Elonis used Facebook under the pseudonym “Tone Dougie” to post violent, self-described rap lyrics about his estranged wife, former co-workers, a kindergarten class, and law-enforcement personnel. The posts included disclaimers that they were fictional or therapeutic, but recipients viewed some as threats; his employer fired him, his wife obtained a protection-from-abuse order, and the FBI investigated. A federal jury convicted Elonis on four of five counts under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which criminalizes transmitting an interstate communication containing a threat to injure another. The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict if a reasonable person would foresee that the statements would be interpreted as serious threats, and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that § 875(c) does not make negligence sufficient to establish the threatening nature of a communication. Although the statute does not specify a mental state, the presumption in favor of scienter requires awareness of the facts that make the conduct criminal, including the threatening character of the communication. A reasonable-person instruction improperly reduced culpability on the central criminal element to negligence and therefore could not support the conviction. The Court stated that the statute is satisfied if the defendant transmitted the communication to issue a threat or with knowledge that it would be viewed as a threat, but declined to decide whether recklessness would suffice. Because the disposition rested on statutory mens rea, the Court did not reach the First Amendment arguments. Justice Alito would have held that recklessness suffices and Justice Thomas would have affirmed under a general-intent standard.

Opinion

Loading published copy…

The Far Side