Kelly Kautz, the mayor of Snellville, brought a declaratory action against the city council over who could terminate the city attorney’s employment. The trial court ruled against Kautz, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the council had sole removal authority. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Snellville’s charter authorized the mayor to appoint the city attorney, but it did not set the attorney’s tenure or provide another removal mechanism. Applying Georgia’s longstanding rule that removal power is incident to appointment power when an office’s tenure is otherwise indefinite, the Supreme Court held that the mayor retained authority to remove the city attorney. The council’s general grant of governmental power did not displace that rule because it was not specific enough to counter the legal principle governing appointment and removal. The Court limited its decision to the charter version under which the disputed removal occurred and declined to address the effect of a later amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, with all Justices concurring.