In 1993, Gregory Levin broke into his former wife’s home, held her hostage for roughly twelve hours, and was convicted of kidnapping with bodily injury and related offenses. After Georgia’s Supreme Court clarified the kidnapping asportation requirement in Garza, Levin sought habeas relief, arguing that the movement inside the home did not satisfy the new standard. The habeas court denied relief, but the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed. Under Garza, the inquiry considers the duration and location of movement, whether it occurred during another crime, and whether it substantially isolated the victim from protection or rescue. Levin forced the victim to move between rooms while holding her at gunpoint, but he encountered her in the bedroom, kept her under control throughout, and did not increase her danger or isolate her beyond the original encounter. The movement therefore did not constitute the kind of asportation required for kidnapping. The kidnapping conviction was reversed, the life sentence vacated, and the trial court was directed to revisit sentencing on the aggravated-battery conviction that had merged into kidnapping. Justice Blackwell concurred, noting an unresolved question about whether the State may retry a defendant when an appellate court changes the law after the original trial; the majority did not decide that issue.