Patrick Cawley was arrested for DUI and speeding in 2009, but his case remained unresolved for almost five years. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss for violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, attributing most of the delay to Cawley and treating the remaining delay as evenly divided. In an earlier appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals had required more detailed findings under Barker v. Wingo and Doggett v. United States. On the second appeal, the Court held that the trial court materially misallocated responsibility for the delay. Cawley was responsible for only limited periods, while delays caused by the State, the assigned judge’s retirement, unexplained docket inactivity, and the prior appeal had to be weighed against the State, generally lightly where they were neutral rather than deliberate. The court also held that the nearly 58-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, although Cawley’s delayed assertion of the right and limited proof of actual prejudice weighed against him. Because the corrected analysis might permit either result, the Court vacated the order and remanded for a new balancing of the Barker-Doggett factors. Presiding Judge Andrews dissented, concluding that the delayed assertion and lack of prejudice required denial of the motion.