During a divorce, David Patton and Jocelyn Vanterpool consented to an in vitro fertilization procedure using donor ova and donor sperm. The procedure occurred before the divorce decree was entered, but the child was born about 29 weeks later. Vanterpool sought a paternity determination and child support, arguing that Georgia’s statute irrebuttably presumed legitimacy for children conceived by artificial insemination when both spouses consented in writing. The trial court granted her summary judgment on paternity. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the statute’s reference to artificial insemination did not extend to in vitro fertilization. Applying the statutory text’s ordinary meaning, the court concluded that the statute did not address this procedure and therefore did not reach Patton’s constitutional challenge. The court reversed the judgment. A presiding judge dissented, arguing that the statute should be construed to protect the child conceived through the assisted-reproduction procedure.