After a stipulated-facts bench trial, Munna was found guilty of two habitual-violator counts and separate DUI and lane-maintenance offenses. The State discovered that prior DUI arrests and a habitual-violator notice had been recorded under Munna’s other surname, Mathura. Munna argued that a driver’s license issued in the name Munna authorized him to drive and that the State had not proved the habitual-violator offense. He also challenged the denial of his constitutional speedy-trial motion after a roughly 40-month delay. The Court of Appeals of Georgia held the evidence sufficient to support the habitual-violator conviction but vacated the order denying a new trial insofar as it rejected Munna’s speedy-trial claim. The trial court’s findings did not permit review under Barker v. Wingo, so the case was remanded for findings and conclusions under that framework. Under OCGA § 40-5-58, the relevant question was whether Munna had been notified that his license was revoked and then operated a vehicle without a license restored by the Department; a purportedly valid license under another name did not defeat the habitual-violator status when the evidence established that Munna and Mathura were the same person. The speedy-trial record required a different result. Once the trial court found the delay presumptively prejudicial, it had to make findings on the length of delay, responsibility for the delay, the timing of Munna’s assertion, and prejudice under Barker v. Wingo and Doggett v. United States. Its conclusory statements did not permit appellate review.