Thomas represented himself during a jury trial and received a life sentence for crimes arising from two armed attacks on women, including rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery. In four related appeals, he challenged his arrest, grand-jury proceedings, speedy-trial ruling, ability to represent himself, jury proceedings, and counsel’s performance. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence from the stolen-vehicle stop. Police had a particularized and objective basis for a brief investigative stop based on repeated suspicious activity, recent vehicle thefts, the matching vehicle, and the driver’s apparent attempt to leave; the stolen tag then supplied probable cause for arrest. The court also rejected challenges to the indictments, nolle prosequi orders, alleged ex parte hearings, juror proceedings, and ineffective-assistance claims. It held, however, that the record was incomplete concerning when and why Thomas’s pro se status changed, including competency proceedings and appointed counsel’s participation. Because self-representation is constitutionally protected and its denial can be structural error, the court remanded to complete the record. The court separately vacated the trial court’s speedy-trial ruling. The trial court had not adequately analyzed the reasons for delay, the relationship between Thomas’s attempts to represent himself and the timing of his speedy-trial demand, or the increasing presumption of prejudice from prolonged pretrial incarceration. The case was remanded for supported factual findings and renewed Barker balancing, after which Thomas could refile his notices of appeal.