John Johnson was arrested and indicted for murder, but more than five years passed before trial. Two alleged accomplices who had agreed to testify for the State disappeared, the case was placed on the dead docket, and one witness was later located in a Louisiana prison. Johnson repeatedly announced that he was ready for trial but did not assert his constitutional speedy-trial right until shortly before the rescheduled trial. The trial court dismissed the indictment after applying the Barker-Doggett factors. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the delay was long enough to trigger presumed prejudice and that the State bore responsibility for much of it, but the trial court improperly treated Johnson’s late assertion and claimed oppressive incarceration and anxiety as favoring him. Because the appellate court may not weigh the Barker factors in the first instance, it reversed and remanded for a new balancing. The majority explained that the length of delay favored Johnson, the State’s witness-related delay favored him but relatively lightly, the late assertion favored the State subject to mitigation, and prejudice cut both ways. Justices Benham and Melton dissented, arguing that the record showed no actual defense impairment and that remand would only delay justice.