Terrance Curry was arrested in 2006 for aggravated assault and related crimes, but the State did not indict him until November 2008, shortly before he was due to leave custody on an earlier sex-offense sentence. The trial court denied Curry’s motion alleging pre-indictment delay and granted his separate motion alleging delay in prosecution, concluding that the delay violated his speedy-trial rights. In consolidated appeals, the Georgia Court of Appeals vacated both rulings and remanded. The court held that the approximately 57-month period had to be analyzed under the four-factor Barker-Doggett framework: length, reason, assertion, and prejudice. The trial court improperly considered only portions of the delay, failed to account for Curry’s pre-indictment silence and the most serious form of prejudice—impairment of the defense—and treated the absence of a showing on one factor as eliminating the need to consider another. The court also held that Curry’s pre-indictment-delay claim concerned the Sixth Amendment right that attaches at arrest or formal accusation, not the distinct due-process test governing delay before arrest or indictment. The trial court was directed to reconsider both claims under the proper standard.