Daniel Prickett sued Imelda Zaldivar for injuries from a vehicle collision. Zaldivar sought to have the jury assign some fault to Prickett’s employer, Overhead Door Company, based on alleged negligent entrustment of the company truck Prickett was driving. The trial court granted Prickett partial summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that negligent entrustment could not be a proximate cause of injuries to the person entrusted with the vehicle. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed. It held that Georgia’s apportionment statute requires a jury to consider a nonparty’s fault only when the nonparty committed a tort against the plaintiff that proximately caused the injury, but an employer’s negligent entrustment can satisfy that causal requirement. The Court explained that proximate cause and comparative negligence are distinct: a plaintiff’s negligence may reduce or bar recovery as an affirmative defense without eliminating the causal connection between the entrustor’s breach and the injury. The Court disapproved Ridgeway v. Whisman and decisions relying on it to the extent they treated negligent entrustment as incapable of causing injury to the entrusted person. On remand, Zaldivar could seek an apportionment finding only if she proved that Overhead Door breached a duty owed to Prickett and that breach proximately caused his injury. Justice Benham dissented, reasoning that workers’ compensation immunity meant Overhead Door could never be liable in tort and therefore could not be included in apportionment.